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THE INTERPENETRATION OF NARROW
CONSTRUCTION AND POLICY: MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS' CIRCUIT OPINIONS
Judicial conduct can be understood not only by examining trends
within the law but also by reviewing words and actions of individ-
ual justices. An in-depth analysis of a particular justice may be
the most accurate way to reconcile past and present positions while
predicting future decisions.' As Professor Fuller stated:
The object of research conducted along these lines would seem to
be not so much to measure the influence on his decisions of thejudge's personal beliefs and attitudes, but to discover what Ihering
called "latent rules," that is unexpressed rules that actually govern
the judicial process.2
Our purpose in examining Justice Stevens' opinions while he sat
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is more limited. We seek
only to identify those themes and concerns which permeate his opin-
ions. Although our approach grows out of the realist school of cri-
ticism, 3 for two reasons we limit ourselves to the veneer of reality
1. Rodell, For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing,
50 GEO. L.J. 700, 701 (1962).
2. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HAzy. L.
REv. 1604, 1614 (1966) (footnote omitted).
3. See B. CAnwozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 59-70 (1924); B. CARDozo,
THE NATURE OF THE JuDicrAL PRocEss 112-15 (1921); L. FULER, Tns LAW
IN QUEST OF ITsELF 53-55 (1940); Frank, Are Judges Human? (pts. 1-2),
80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 223 (1931); Massaro, "Fortascast." Dark Clouds
over President Ford's Forthcoming Supreme Court Nominations, 34 FED. B.J.
257, 265 (1975); Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pts. 1-3), 36 HARv.
L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923); Shuler, Realist Needles in a Positivist Hay-
stack: A Study of Attitudes Operative in the Decisions of Supreme Court
Justices, 32 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 1, 1-5 (1974). See also Steiner, Judicial
Discretion and the Concept of Law, 35 CAlvi. L.J. 135 (1976). But cf. Hall,
Integrative Jurisprudence, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 779, 784-85 (1976).
Our method was rudimentary. We read all Justice (then Judge) Stevens'
opinions, including per curiam decisions. Next, we classified each opinion
by subject. Then we noted the presence or absence of the following factors
in each decision: length of the opinion, disposition of the trial court or ad-
ministrative decision, plaintiff or defendant, number of issues discussed, rel-
ative importance of the facts to the question presented, source material re-
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represented by Justice Stevens' opinions: The opinions are acces-
sible,4 and the Justice has indicated that his prior decisions are pre-
lied upon, votes of other judges in relation to Justice Stevens, scope of the
opinion, justificatory method utilized, avoidance techniques used by Justice
Stevens, importance of stare decisis, any comments on the function of thejudiciary, relative deference to political institutions, importance of tech-
nique in relation to policy, Justice Stevens' concern for judicially manage-
able standards, any self-conscious discussion by Justice Stevens concerning
the role of the judge. Finally, we placed each decision within one of four
rough categories: naturalism (Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the model),
realism (judges evaluate legal precepts by their contribution to the welfare
of society), legal positivism (Mr. Justice Black), socio-legalism (Mr. Justice
Cardozo).
We acknowledge that the schema was crude and subjective. However,
independent verification of our analysis is available. This Comment was
written prior to the publication by Vanderbilt University of a special stu-
dent project reviewing Justice Stevens' opinions. Nevertheless, our conclu-
sions are in substantial agreement with their work. See Special Project,
The One Hundred and First Justice: An Analysis of the Opinions of Justice
John Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, 29 VAZo. L. REv. 125 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Special Project).
4. For a complete list of decisions in which Judge Stevens participated
and a brief topical description, see P. Gormley, P. Morgan, K. Ronhovde,
Compilation of Reported Decisions of the 7th Circuit in which Judge John
Paul Stevens Participated, Oct. 14, 1970-November 25, 1975, December 9,
1975 (The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service), in Nomi-
nation of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-183
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
The following cases were decided by Justice Stevens subsequent to the
compilation in the Hearings. Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prod., 529 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (torts); Stevenson v. Mathews, 529 F.2d
61 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (prisoners); Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528
F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (immigration); Feed Serv. Corp. v.
Kent Foods, Inc., 528 F.2d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part) (patent infringement); Fitzmans v. Jersey State Bank, 528 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (contracts). See Special Project 199-209
for a list of decisions which "the compilers considered of potential interest
to practitioners and scholars .... " Id. at 199 n.*.
In total, Justice Stevens participated in 542 decisions. We read the 289
opinions which Justice Stevens wrote: 161 (30%) majority, seventy (13%)
per curiam, forty (7%) dissent and eighteen (3%) concurrence. Justice
Stevens wrote in 53 percent of the decisions in which he participated.
In addition, we examined the following secondary source material written
by the Justice: Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JusricE 318 (A. Dun-
ham & P. Kurland eds. rev. ed. 1964); Stevens, Exemptions from Antitrust,
37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 706 (1968); Stevens, Symposium-Regulated In-
dustries and Antitrust, Introductory Remarks, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST LJ. 215
(1967); Stevens, Antitrust and the Regulated and Exempt Industries, The
Regulation of Railroads, 19 A.B.A. SEcTioN ANTITRUST L. 355 (1961);
Stevens, Cost Justification, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 413 (1963); Stevens, The Of-
fice of an Office, 55 Cm. B. Rzc. 276 (1974); Stevens, The Robinson-Patman
Act Prohibitions, 38 Cm. B. REc. 310 (1957); Stevens & Johnston, Monopoly
or Monopolization-A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. REv. 269 (1949);
Stevens, Book Review, 28 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 430 (1953); Stevens, Book Re-
view, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 384 (1952).
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dictive of his future conduct. 5
Considered in isolation the opinions present a severely frag-
mented view of the Justice's personal approach to decisionmaking. 6
A myriad of factors constricts the expression of individual beliefs
on the bench: the quality of the bar which shapes the issues, 7 a
collegial court which requires the accommodation of other judg-
ments,s the advocatory nature of an opinion,9 the inability to artic-
ulate the reasons for a decision,10 and the avoidance of personal
statements. Within these restrictions, this Comment will examine
Justice Stevens' approach to documentary construction and discern
his attitudes toward constitutional decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION
A detailed analysis of Justice Stevens' career as an appellate
judge must be preceded by general remarks about his apparent
style as a decisionwriter. Justice Stevens dislikes to be rigidly clas-
sified," but his general judicial philosophy seems to be one of re-
5. Hearings 43.
6. Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative
Agencies, 14 VA=i. L. REv. 473, 483 (1961).
7. Schaefer, Good Judges, Better Judges, Best Judges, 44 J. Am . JuD.
Soc'Y 22, 23 (1960).
8. Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 480.
9. Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W.L.
REV. 361, 455, 461 (1970); Lewis, Phase Theory and the Judicial Process,
1 CAur. W.L. REV. 1, 32 (1965).
10. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 38 (1931).
11. Hearings 32. Even so, Justice Stevens' biography discloses his pri-
mary interest in antitrust. Born: April 20, 1920, Chicago, Illinois. Marital
status: Married, wife-Elizabeth Jane Sheeren-four children. Education:
1937-41-University of Chicago, A.B. degree; Phi Beta Kappa, and 1945-47-
Northwestern University, School of Law, J.D. degree, magna cum laude,
Order of the Coif, Co-Editor Illinois Law Review. Military Service: 1942-
45, United States Navy, Lieutenant. Experience: 1947-48-Law Clerk to
Mr. Justice Wiley Rutledge, United States Supreme Court; 1948-51-1952-
Associate, Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Raymond (now Jenner &
Block), Chicago, Illinois; 1950-Associate Counsel, Sub-Comnnittee on Study
of Monopoly Power, United States House of Representatives; 1950-54-
Lecturer on Antitrust Law, Northwestern Law School; 1954, 1955-58-Lec-
turer, University of Chicago Law School; 1952-70-Partner, Rothschild, Ste-
vens, Barry & Myers (formerly Rothschild, Stevens & Barry; Rothschild,
Hart, Stevens & Barry); 1970-75-United States Circuit Judge, 7th Circuit
and 1975 to present-Justice, United States Supreme Court. Bar: 1949, Illi-
nois. Memberships: Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws; Chicago Bar Association: 1960-61-Chairman Antitrust
straint in the neutral 12 application of positive law or precedent to
the facts before him. Justice Stevens avoids policy decisions except
when interstitial 13 gaps in the law require a decision and rarely
Law Committee; 1961-62-Chairman Committee on Candidates; 1963-65-
Board of Managers; 1969-Chairman Committee on the Judiciary; 1970-
Second Vice-President, Federal and American Bar Association. Counsel to
the Special Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Illinois to in-
vestigate the integrity of the judgment in People v. Isaacs (1969), which
resulted in the resignation of two Illinois Supreme Court justices.
This biographical sketch is based on information provided by Judge Ste-
vens' law clerk and from Hearings 3.
12. See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1959), reprinted in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLI-
TIcs, Am FUNDAMENTAL LAW 4 (1961), and H. WECHSLER, SELECTED ESSAYS
1938-62, at 463 (1963). But see generally L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-
30 (1958).
13. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 69 (1921).
E.g., Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 105 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). But see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3, 29 (1960).
In sum, a quick understanding of Justice Stevens may be obtained by
realizing he relies upon the opinions of Mr. Justice Rutledge, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Harlan (the younger). This conclusion is
based on our notation of every justice whom Justice Stevens cited by name.
See methodological discussion supra note 3.
The impact of Justice Rutledge is derived from Justice Stevens' work as
a Law Clerk for the Justice and (then) Mr. Stevens' commentary on Justice
Rutledge. See notes 4, 11 supra; note 94 infra.
In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972), affirmed a thirty-day criminal
contempt sentence for defendant's failure to stand for either judge or jury.
In dissent, Justice Stevens drew upon Justice Frankfurter's definition of the
law:
Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner
life of man. It rests in large measure upon compulsion.... The
consent upon which free government rests is the consent that comes
from sharing in the process of making and unmaking laws. West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting). 468 F.2d at 140 n.11.
Justice Stevens is perhaps most willing to follow the lead of Justice Har-
lan (the younger). In Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court held that absent an intelligent waiver or the conclusion by counsel
that the case is frivolous, the state is constitutionally required to protect
the petitioner's right to appeal. Rather than rely on the majority opinion's
equal protection analysis in Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), Justice Ste-
vens shifted to Justice Harlan's concurring (id. at 485) due process rationale.
Justice Stevens has stated he will give greater weight to opinions by Mr,
Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Judge Hastings of the Seventh
Circuit. Hearings 40, 31. But we have not discerned the same degree of
ideological reliance upon these judges as upon Justices Rutledge, Frank-
furter, and Harlan.
Professor Hart is the only jurisprudential scholar whom Justice Stevens
has cited. See Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 88 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974), reh'g,
489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973). Compare H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW(1961) and Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAv.
L. REv. 593 (1958), with L. FULLER, THE MORAIrTY OF LAW (1969) and Fuller,
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reaches constitutional issues. He would limit the federal judicial
function14 by deciding cases on justiciability grounds 15 or in accord-
ance with extant precedent 6 rather than expanding the federal
law. In his words:
[I]t is the business of a judge to decide cases that come before him.
From time to time, in the process of deciding cases, important de-
cisions are made and the law takes a little different turn from time
to time. But it has always been my philosophy to decide cases
on the narrowest ground possible and not to reach out for constitu-
tional questions. I think that is the tradition, that is the finest tra-
dition of the work of the Supreme Court and I think the Court is
most effective when it does it own business the best.'7
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAv. L.
REv. 630 (1958).
14. Hearings 42, 50. See Rydell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial Self-
Restraint, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 875, 909 (1975). The remainder of the para-
graph draws upon Mr. Rydell's definition of a judicial conservative.
Justice Stevens has expressed concern that his rate of dissent, 7 per-
cent (supra note 4), might be viewed as abnormally high. He attributes
the apparent abnormality to a general proclivity in the Seventh Circuit to
express even the most minimal disagreement. Hearings 41. In fact, Justice
Stevens' level of dissent is 3.9 percent higher than the average rate of dis-
sent in the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits but 2.4 percent
lower than Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger's rate while he sat on the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Howard, Litigation Flow in
Three United States Courts of Appeals, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 33, 40 (1973).
The true significance of Justice Stevens' high rate of dissent may lie in the
fact that:
[T] he typical dissenter has been a tenacious advocate of traditional
legal doctrines which were being abandoned during his tenure; con-
sequently he adhered to precedent with far greater regularity than
his non-dissenting colleagues, and his persistent attempts at turning
back the doctrinal tides of his era usually met with failure.
Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. ToRoNTO
L.J. 194, 209 (1962).
15. See Hearings 36, 54, 68-69. But see Special Project 190-94.
16. Oelsher, Opinions by Stevens Hint Attitudes of Nominee to Court,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1975, § 1, at 37, col. 1. See Hearings 39.
In this respect Justice Stevens should satisfy Professor Wigmore's lament
that an "acquaintance with legal history is almost totally lacking" amongjudges. Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions, 9 ILL. L. REV.
529, 530 (1915). Justice Stevens rarely misses an opportunity to quote from
T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE AccEssIoN OF JAvrs II (10
vols. 1896). See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1115 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975); Stevens, The Office of an Office,
supra note 4. His historical bent has taken him as far back as Darcy v.
Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602) to discover the original purpose be-
hind "the royal prerogative" of a patent. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Gid-
dings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 590 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1066 (1972).
17. Hearings 36.
Though the general theme of his opinions is one of restraint, our
analysis of Justice Stevens indicates policy preferences enter his de-
cisions in at least two areas: cases involving either gender dis-
crimination or prisoners' rights. Besides presenting Justice Stev-
ens' approach to constitutional decisionmaking and documentary
construction, we will reconcile his policy preferences with his
avowed judicial philosophy.
Resisting the temptation to predict the impact of a new justice
upon current issues of constitutional adjudication, we focus on Jus-
tice Stevens' statements concerning a judge's role in the decision-
making process. This role can be traced through his decisions in-
volving contracts, administrative regulations, statutes, and the Con-
stitution. These documents, ranging from the most personal to the
most public, form a hierarchy of written instruments based on con-
sent. Because Justice Stevens defines himself as a narrow con-
structionist, his treatment of documents should demonstrate the ex-
tent to which he fits his self-defined role and may illuminate his
treatment of the Constitution. In addition, a consideration of his
due process decisions,18 particularly those involving state action,
procedural and substantive fairness, gender discrimination, and
prisoners' rights, provides a representative model for analyzing his
approach to constitutional decisionmaking. These cases are particu-
larly appropriate, for the questions of law they involved were in
flux while Judge Stevens sat on the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Because at that time Supreme Court precedent was sparse
or unclear, Judge Stevens had a certain freedom of decision.
DocumENTARY CoNsTRucrIoN
The Constitution is a written document.19 Thus it falls, albeit
uniquely, within the class of written instruments which the judi-
ciary must interpret. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the
manner in which Justice Stevens construes other documents: con-
tracts, administrative regulations, and statutes. Because a substan-
tial portion of the Court's business does not involve constitutional
adjudication, reviewing Justice Stevens' non-constitutional deci-
sions is necessary. Moreover, construction of these documents pro-
vides a control group 20 with which to contrast Justice Stevens'
18. By due process we mean to include cases in which equal protection
claims were also present. Compare Hampton v. Sun Wong, 44 U.S.L.W,
4737, 4740, 4742 (U.S. June 1, 1976) (Stevens, J.), with id. at 4746 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
19. But see Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 703 (1975). See also C. BLAcK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP W
CoNsTrNZUOxAL LAW (1969).
20. Admittedly constitutional adjudication significantly differs from more
traditional cases. Nevertheless, it is helpful to juxtapose Justice Stevens'
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process of constitutional decisionmaking. Because construction of
the Constitution often goes beyond an analysis of the words found
in that document, a treatment of these cases may foreshadow Jus-
tice Stevens' approach to the Constitution. To the extent the Con-
stitution is treated merely as a super-statute, Justice Stevens' com-
mentaries on these documents are predictive of his future constitu-
tional interpretation.
Contracts
Justice Stevens is averse to leaving the four corners of a contract
in order to derive its meaning.21 When he does consider other
sources, he tends to prefer previous explications by field specialists
such as the National Labor Relations Board or by the parties to the
contract. For example, in International Minerals & Chemical Corp.
v. Husky Oil Co.,22 the parties had failed to state whether interest
was payable upon surrender of a leasehold.23 In dissent, Justice
Stevens took this failure of specification as his cue to find that the
plain meaning24 of surrender "constitute[d] payment in full"1 2 5 and
that such an interpretation comported with the underlying transac-
tion. The threshold fact for Justice Stevens was that "[t] here is
no express reference to the payment of interest, in addition to the
conveyance of the property."2 6  In contradistinction to Justice
Stevens' analysis, the majority pointed out:
It is also true that this contingency did not expressly state that in-
terest would not be due and payable as in the case of the accelera-
tion clause, where the words IMC "shall . . . credit Husky's Note
account in the [principal] amount ... plus interest" were em-
ployed.27
treatment of the traditional case and the constitutional case, to provide a
complete picture of his approach to problem resolution.
21. See, e.g., Economy Finance Corp. v. United States, 501 F.2d 466, 483
(7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975);
Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 816-17 (7th Cir. 1972). See also
Special Project 186-88.
22. 485 F.2d 153, 161 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 162.
24. See also Murphy, Old Mai ms Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule"
and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLmv. L.
REv. 1299 (1975).
25. 485 F.2d at 162.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 157.
Having found this hole in the contract, the majority proceeded to
fill it with an implied obligation, based upon secondary sources,
28
to pay interest. Characteristically, Justice Stevens hesitated to find
implicit meaning in the parties' absence of expression and was re-
luctant to rely on secondary source material.
Administrative Regulations-Product Safety
Justice Stevens has adopted a broader standard of review 20 for
administrative agencies dealing with products: The product must
be demonstrably detrimental, and the results of its removal must
be not only demonstrably safer but also practicable. Thus Justice
Stevens does not impose a policy decision that competition must
continue despite any consequences. Instead of prohibiting the
product because of its deleterious effects, he demands the agency
consider available practical alternatives. When an agency has
shown its due consideration of these standards, Justice Stevens will
uphold the agency regulation.
3 0
Consistently3 ' Justice Stevens has been reluctant to take a prod-
uct off the market. In Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. EPA,32 misuse
of phosphorous paste as a rodent deterrent was proven to kill child-
ren and even some adults. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens pointed
out:
No details whatever were given as to the comparative effectiveness
of the alternatives in rodent and roach control in the lower socio-
economic areas or of comparative cost or difficulty of administra-
tion.33
His argument was that even if the product is harmful, the agency
failed to weigh the comparative costs of eliminating the product.
28. Id. at 159.
29. E.g.,
Congress deliberately selected a broader standard for review of
food additive tolerance to focus on the fairness of the evaluation
so that the "[p]ersonal attitudes or preferences of administrative
officials could not prevail on the basis of being supported by sub-
stantial evidence picked from the record without regard to other
evidence of probative value in the record ...... Continental
Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 341 n.37 (7th Cir.
1972).
Compare Hampton v. Sun Wong, 44 U.S.L.W. 4737 (U.S. June 1, 1976
(Stevens, J.), with Mathews v. Diaz, 44 U.S.L.W. 4748 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
See also Comment, Vapor Recovery: Last Gasp of the Clean Air Act?, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 354, 372 (1976); text accompanying note 75 infra.
30. See United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975). See also Special Project 182-90.
31. H & H Tire Co. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 471 F.2d 350, 356
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., concurring); Continental Chemiste Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972); Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. EPA,
461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972).
32. 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Special Project 182-83.
33. Id. at 298 n.10.
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Similarly, in H & H Tire Co. v. United States Department of
Transportation,4 Justice Stevens concurred in a result which pre-
cluded the imposition of stricter standards on retreaded tires:
Although I recognize that safety is the "overriding consideration
in the issuance of standards" under this Act[35] the statute re-
quires respondent to consider whether a proposed standard is
reasonable, practicable and appropriate" before it is prescribed.
In my opinion this duty has not been discharged until respondent
has at least identified some of the costs associated with the proposal
and determined that these costs are overridden by reasonably pre-
dictable benefits.3 6
If these administrative standards were acts of Congress, the deci-
sions could easily be characterized as Lochnerizing37 because of
their emphasis on freedom of choice.38 In fact, one commentator
criticized H & H Tire as an example of "the potential pitfalls" of
"judicial activism" when the "complex questions of the needs of
safety" are "second-guessed by the courts."3 9
In sum, with an administrative regulation, as opposed to a con-
tract, Justice Stevens enforces two policy considerations external
to the document: He seeks to encourage competition,"0 and he de-
34. 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972).
35. National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381
et seq. (1970).
36. 471 F.2d at 356-57 (footnotes omitted).
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Gunther, Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 42 (1972).
38. See H & H Tire Co. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 471 F.2d 350,
356 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Morgan, Seventh Circuit Review-Administrative Law, 50 CH.-KENT
L. REV. 214, 216 (1973).
40. Cf. Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 56 (1975) (Clayton Act violation); CONOCO v. Witco Chemical
Corp., 484 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1973) (patent infringement); Continental
Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1972) (patent
infringement); Stevens, Symposium-Regulated Industries and Antitrust,
Introductory Remarks, supra note 4, at 244. But cf. Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592
(U.S. Apr. 20, 1976) (underwriter of short term commercial paper held
liable for failure to investigate the issuer despite reliance on fraudulently
prepared financial statements); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
Douglas, and White, JJ., would have granted certiorari. Powell, J., took
no part in the decision.), overruled, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
427 U.S. 723 (1975). Eason held the rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (plaintiff
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sires to ensure the availability of practical alternatives.4 1
Statutes
Statutory construction 42 is the paradigm43 of documentary con-
struction. Following a traditional approach to construction prob-
lems, Justice Stevens looks to the basic purpose of the legislation,
44
then to the legislative intent with respect to the specific act,4" and
finally to the structure of the entire statute.46 These factors pro-
vide the framework through which Justice Stevens approaches the
specific section or phrase in question. For guidance he relies upon
a fairly well-defined hierarchy of counselors: Supreme Court opin-
ions,47 statements by the bill's major proponents, 48 the historical
context in which the bill was enacted,4 9 congressional failure to
state a proposition which one would expect to find in the act had
Congress so intended,50 the alternative construction most consistent
in a rule lOb-5 action [17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1975) ] must be either a pur-
chaser or seller of a security) was no longer applicable. See text accom-
panying notes 91-94 infra.
41. For a further elaboration of the external construction theory, see text
accompanying notes 79-80 infra. Accord, Special Project 169, 189-90.
42. See generally Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory In-
terpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1965); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Traynor, Statutes
Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATHOLIc U.L. REv. 401 (1968); Com-
ment, Statutory Construction-The Role of the Court, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 382
(1969).
43. For a further exposition of our use of the terms paradigm, normal
(text accompanying notes 79-80 infra) and exemplar (text accompanying
notes 154-55 infra), see T. KuN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIc REvoLUTIoNs
(2d ed. 1970); Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM AD THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave rev. ed. 1972). E.g., Lines
v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir.
1975); United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971).
45. See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1973).
46. See Hodgson v. Lodge 851, AFL-CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 557 (7th Cir. 1971)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Special Project 164-82.
47. See, e.g., Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972), overruled, Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 151 (1972); United States v. Merle A. Patnode Co., 457 F.2d 116
(7th Cir. 1972).
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 825 n.35, 826 n.37
(7th Cir. 1972); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Confer. of Teamsters,
454 F.2d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1972). For Justice Stevens' use of committee
reports compare Kelly v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307, 310, with Brennan
v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 514 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
and Kronenberger v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 18, 19 (7th Cir. 1974).
49. See Blew v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1973).
50. United States v. Zemater, 501 F.2d 540, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam).
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with the act's purpose,5 ' and administrative regulations.52
Two examples from the field of labor law aptly evince Justice
Stevens' approach to statutory construction. Associated General
Contractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters83 presented the
question of whether the district court could enjoin a strike to pre-
serve its jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. Justice Stevens
relied on three critical factors in holding that the district court did
not have the power to enjoin the strike. First, the dispute was
"squarely covered" 54 by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,55 whose purpose
was to curtail the judiciary's "participation in determining the mer-
its of the issues arising between unions and employers."56 Second,
Justice Stevens relied on the Supreme Court's construction of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770:57
[TJhe Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of injunctive
relief in ... the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract
contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration proce-
dure..
Therefore, the third and determinative factor for Justice Stevens
was that "[t] he union had not agreed to compulsory arbitration.
On the contrary, it had expressly reserved the right to 'economic
recourse' in the event of a deadlock."58
In other words, in terms of the original model, Justice Stevens
derived the basic purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act from its his-
torical context and the Supreme Court opinion in Boys Markets. In
applying this purpose, Justice Stevens found, as required by Boys
Markets, that the contractual language was controlling.59
51. See, e.g., Brennan v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 514 F.2d 1082, 1084(7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); McTaggart v. Secretary of the Air Force, 458
F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (7th Cir. 1972).
52. Blew v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1973).
53. 454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972).
54. Id. at 1328.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
56. Id.
57. 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970). See generally Axelrod, The Application of
the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C. INw. & Com. L.
REV. 893 (1975); Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The
Boys Markets Case, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 215 (P. Kurland ed.
1970).
58. 454 F.2d at 1329.
59. See also text accompanying notes 21-28 supra; Special Project 175-
77.
Hodgson v. Lodge 851, AFL-CIO60 is a fascinating case because
Justice Stevens opens his dissent by stating that "[tflhis case in-
volves a narrow issue of statutory construction"61 and concludes
eleven pages later by saying that:
[I]f in the day-to-day business of government the Executive is per-
mitted to substitute his ideas of expedience for policy determina-
tions unambiguously expressed by Congress, larger issues will rou-
tinely be decided without regard to our basic constitutional
scheme.62
The Secretary of Labor must institute suit within sixty days " in
order to require a new union election based on union violations of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.04 The issue
in Hodgson was whether the Secretary was justified under the Act
in relying upon the union's waiver of this time limitation. Nar-
rowly construing the statute, Justice Stevens would have required
the Secretary to file within sixty days. Irrespective of the substan-
tive outcome,65 his analysis of the statute is a model to emulate.
His method is only summarized here.
First, Justice Stevens noted that the alternative remedies within
the structure of the Act66 were in the union member's control.
Therefore, he concluded that with respect to the particular section
in question (where the Secretary retained "unique"67 control over
the available remedy) "the repeated use of mandatory language"06
must be given full effect. Next, Justice Stevens buttressed his
analysis by examining the section's60 purpose and its legislative his-
tory.70 He copiously detailed the "changes in form" of the section
60. 454 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1971). See generally Hopson, Judicial Review
of the Secretary of Labor's Decision Not to Sue to Set Aside a Union Election
under Title IV of the LMRDA, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1281 (1972); Rauh,
LMRDA-Enforce it or Repeal it, 5 GA. L. REv. 643 (1971) (details the De-
partment of Labor's inaction while Messrs. Boyle and Yablonski fought for
control of the UMW).
61. 454 F.2d at 554.
62. Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
64. Id. § 401 et seq. The waiver would usually be executed by the union
officials whose conduct was under attack.
65. Obviously, the majority decided contra to Justice Stevens and so did
Hodgson v. International Printing Pressmen, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).
66. 454 F.2d at 555-56 (7th Cir. 1971).
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id. at 557, 563-64.
69. Id. at 557 ("to ensure prompt vindication of a meritorious claim for
the benefit of the dissident members as well as the general public"). Jus-
tice Stevens argued that the Act should not be interpreted merely as a stat-
ute of limitations.
70. Id. at 557-61.
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and the "comments of interested" legislators.7 1 Finally, Justice
Stevens rebutted the arguments put forth by the Secretary.72 Spe-
cifically, he concluded that the estoppel theory was inappropriate
because "it permits the Secretary to disguise his general practice
in the clothing of an exceptional case."73 Congressional acquies-
cence in a course of administrative conduct did not constitute a rati-
fication of the procedure. 74 The Secretary's policy of negotiation
should not mitigate the congressional command to file suit within
sixty days.
7 5
As discussed above, Justice Stevens encountered a similar prob-
lem in International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Husky Oil Co.,'
a case concerning contractual interpretation. Under the 1958 draft
the Secretary would have been required to respond within sixty
days, but the statute as finally enacted left this requirement un-
clear.77 The Hodgson majority filled this hole with policy consider-
ations enunciated by commentators.78 In contrast, Justice Stevens
argued that the "language change" from the draft to the statute
was a mere convenience of expression, not a shift of policy.7 9
71. Id. at 557.
72. Id. at 561-64.
73. Id. at 561.
74. Congress does not sit as a singleminded watchdog ready to bark
out a clarifying amendment at every departure from its command.
It is more like a slumbering army; when aroused it has power to
march where it will. One who desires to direct its attention to a
specific problem must not only have a strong reason to do so, but
also must be willing to risk the consequences of unanticipated ac-
tion. An interpretation of a provision in the controversial and inte-
grated statute which finally emerged from the legislative process
in 1959 cannot fairly be predicated on unexplained inaction by dif-
ferent Congresses in subsequent years. Id. at 562.
See also Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Depart-
ments, 1 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 13 (1974).
75. Compare Justice Stevens' belief that "[tJhe lessons of history teach
us that the dedication of the eager new administrator may eventually be
replaced by the malaise of the bureaucrat who acts no faster and no more
often than is absolutely necessary," 454 F.2d at 564 (footnote omitted), with
the high standard of review he applies to administrative regulations, text
accompanying notes 29-41 supra.
76. 485 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See text ac-
companying notes 21-28 supra.
77. Hodgson v. Lodge 851, AFL-CIO, 454 F.2d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 552, citing Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry into Title
IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 336, 365, 375 (1968).
79. 454 F.2d at 559.
In terms of the original model, Justice Stevens examined the
structure of the entire statute and then reviewed legislative intent
with respect to the particular section in order to derive its meaning.
He drew support for his interpretation from the major proponents
of the act and from the historical context in which it was passed.
His conclusion was influenced, as with his reading of contracts, by
his overall reluctance to infer meaning from absence.
The previous examples of normal statutory construction may be
characterized as internal issues of interpretation: The debate on the
court concerns what Congress intended by the words Congress
spoke. In contrast, external problems of construction begin with
one of two alternative premises: either the court has no idea what
Congress intended and thus must establish its own policy; or the
court knows exactly what Congress intended but must decide for
itself the appropriate reach of congressional intent, e.g., the scope
of a statute based on the commerce clause.8 0
An example of external construction based upon a congressional
failure to speak is United States v. McGarr.81 The question was
whether the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Acts2 repealed the parole ineligibility provisions of the Narcotic
Drug Import and Export Act.83 Justice Stevens argued that al-
though the penalty provisions of the Narcotic Drug Act remained,
the repeal of the parole ineligibility section would merely remove
"a procedural bar to the application of the independently existing
provisions for suspended sentence, probation and parole which ap-
ply to most offenses. '8 4
This opinion reflects a policy decision by Justice Stevens which is
external to the statute. Because he is hesitant to expand federal
criminal jurisdiction, 5 he applies a Rewis-Bass8 0 leniency rule to
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
81. 461 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), overruled, Warden v. Mar-
rero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974). Justice Stevens argued that although he would
prefer to follow congressional policy, he could not "attribute to Congress
the intent to reach [an] absurd result .. . ." 461 F.2d at 4. Only Mr. Jus-
tice Blackmun, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall, fol-
lowed Justice Stevens' line of analysis. 417 U.S. at 667, 669. See generally
Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973); Gates v. United States, 515
F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
83. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, § 501, 80 Stat. 1449. The Act
itself has also been repealed. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act (July
18, 1956) ch. 629, § 105, 70 Stat. 570, repealed, 21 U.S.C. 174 (1970).
84. 461 F.2d at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
85. Hearings 29, supra note 4.
86. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808 (1971).
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statutory construction. In other words, absent a clear statement
of congressional intent, he will not presume Congress intended to
expand the reach of federal criminal jurisdiction8 7 and thereby alter
the relationship between federal and state prosecution. 8
Although the precise point was not present in McGarr, Justice
Stevens echoed a similar theme: "[W] hen Congress does expressly
repeal a statute, we should not read a savings clause so broadly that
it encompasses much more than is necessary to achieve its general
purpose . ".8..",9
Statutes with a Constitutional Predicate
External construction is also necessary when Congress passes a
statute specifically based on the text of the Constitution. Though
congressional intent may be clear, a judge must nevertheless inde-
pendently ascertain the proper meaning of the constitutional clause
in question. 0 We will examine two examples of this form of ex-
ternal construction.
In United States v. Staszcuk,91 the question was how far the fed-
eral statute prohibiting interstate robbery or extortion" should ex-
tend into the traditionally local regulation of criminal activity. Be-
87. Even if preemption does not occur and mutual jurisdiction is retained,
the significance of the state's jurisdiction is decreased when another crime
also becomes a federal offense. See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause
Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 271
(1973).
88. United States v. Walker, 489 F.2d 1353, 1355 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 982 (1974). See also Barrett v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 498,
504 (1976).
89. 461 F.2d at 4.
90. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). But cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
91. 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 65 (1975)
(Stevens, J., wrote the majority opinion joined by Fairchild, C.J., Cum-
mings, Tone, and Bauer, JJ.; Sprecher, J., dissented on the basis of his panel
opinion. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974). Swygert, J., concurred with Judge
Sprecher's dissent and also dissented on a voir dire issue. Pell, J., also filed
a dissenting opinion.). See Recent Case, Constitutional Law-interstate
commerce-extortion-federal criminal jurisdiction under Hobbs Act satis-
fied by showing potential effect on commerce, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1348 (1975).
See also Special Project 194.
92. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).
cause the jurisdictional reach of the statute was co-extensive with
that of the commerce clause, 9 Justice Stevens had to determine the
appropriate boundaries of the clause before interpreting the Act.
In doing so, he looked to the policy behind the commerce clause.
The primary purpose of the Commerce Clause was to secure free-
dom of trade, to break down the barriers to its free flow, and to
curtail the rising volume of restraints upon commerce that the Ar-
ticles of Confederation were inadequate to control. A statute which
has a purpose which so unambiguously parallels the fundamental
purpose of its constitutional predicate must receive an expansive
construction. 94
Justice Stevens has also used the technique of external construc-
tion to arrive at a less expansive result. For example, in Kim-
brough v. O'Neill, 5 detention personnel refused to return a pris-
oner's diamond ring. The question was whether the plaintiff could
state a federal claim for conversion under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act.96 Because section 1983 provides a civil remedy for vio-
lations of the fourteenth amendment0 7 due process clause, Justice
Stevens again had to construe the Constitution in order to interpret
a statute. Initially he presented a narrow textual analysis of the
due process clause by pointing out that the words of the clause es-
tablish a tripartite standard: (1) property, life, or liberty must be
involved; (2) state action is required; and (3) the deprivation must
be without due process of law.9 8 Although retention of the pris-
oner's ring was sufficient state infringement to raise the issue, Jus-
tice Stevens held the possibility of recovery via a state-based tort
action precluded the conclusion that the ring was retained without
due process of law. 9 The critical factor for Justice Stevens was
93. "[C]ommerce means . . .all ... commerce over which the United
States has jurisdiction." Id. § 1951 (b) (3).
94. 517 F.2d at 58. Although Justice Stevens usually relies upon prece-
dent, here he based his entire argument upon Justice Rutledge's analysis
of the commerce clause in W. RuTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FA nr 25-
26 (1947), demonstrating again the significant impact Justice Rutledge had
upon Justice Stevens' approach to the law. See notes 4, 11, 13 supra.
95. 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975), reh'g granted, id.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
99. Id. at 1066. Justice Stevens often turns to state-based tort actions
as alternative remedies. See text accompanying notes 119-30 infra. It is
interesting to note, however, that he is equally willing to cite then Chief
Judge Cardozo's majority opinion or Judge Andrew's dissent in Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928). Compare
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 657 n.9 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J., Douglas and White,
J.J., would have granted certiorari. Powell, J., took no part in the decision.),
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not the text of the act but rather the external policy rationale of
avoiding overcrowded dockets by refusing to hear such de minimis
claims in federal courts. 00
Thus in Staszcuk, Justice Stevens, looking to the policy behind
the commerce clause, read the words with a greater scope that re-
sulted in an expansive reading of the text.'01 In Kimbrough, he in-
voked policy considerations external to the purpose of either section
1983 or its constitutional predicate and concluded that a narrow
reading of the text was appropriate.
In sum, Justice Stevens is usually faithful to his credo of narrow
construction. Nevertheless, four policy preferences seem to influ-
ence his decisions: Administrative regulations must reflect a con-
sideration of practical alternatives; federal criminal jurisdiction
should not be expanded; free trade among the several states should
be protected; and the federal courts should be hesitant to expand
their jurisdiction over de minimis constitutional issues.' 02
CoNsTITuTIoNAL ADJUDICATION
Justice Stevens tends to avoid decisions which take an expansive
view of constitutional rights. This inclination is particularly evi-
dent in his due process decisions under either the fourteenth
amendment or the Civil Rights Act.'03 Before he will grant relief,
a petitioner must overcome three obstacles inherent in the Justice's
model: First, state action is necessary for the due process clause to
become operative. Justice Stevens' reasoning makes it difficult to
overcome this initial requirement when a private party, acting with
overruled, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 427 U.S. 723 (1975),
with Kiess v. Eason, 442 F.2d 712, 722, 722 n.16 (1971).
100. See 523 F.2d at 1066.
101. Justice Stevens did express concern about the expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 55 (7th Cir.
1975). Accord, Special Project 171.
102. The reader may have noticed an apparent contradiction in the text.
On the one hand, Justice Stevens seeks to limit the reach of federal criminaljurisdiction (see text accompanying notes 85-89 supra); and on the other
hand, he has expanded federal criminal jurisdiction to provide greater pro-
tection for commerce (see text accompanying notes 91-94 supra). While
the dichotomy is real, we believe this merely represents Justice Stevens'
hierarchy of values. In other words, although it is important to limit fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction, it is more important to protect free trade.
103. 42U.S.C. § 1981 etseq. (1970).
the state's aid, is guilty of the criticized conduct.10 4 Second, if state
action is conspicuous, Justice Stevens struggles to show that any
alternative remedies available to the aggrieved party satisfy the
procedural fairness requirement of the fourteenth amendment.10
Finally, even if no other remedies are available, the petitioner, in
order to recover, must demonstrate that a deprivation of a four-
teenth amendment property right'0 6 has occurred.
104. The Supreme Court has slowly expanded the concept of state action
to include situations in which either the state and a private party were act-
ing in concert or the private party was acting with the aid of the state.
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private
restaurant in a publicly owned building refused to serve a Black patron).
Under Chief Justice Burger, however, the Supreme Court appears to have
halted this trend. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) (electric company terminated service to customer without notice or
hearing); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private club
discriminated even though it had obtained one of a limited number of state
liquor licenses).
105. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Stevens, J., concurring), rehg granted, id. at 1057; Horvath v. Chicago,
510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975); Christman v. Hanrahan, 500 F.2d 65 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939
(7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power
Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
106. In order to come within the purview of the fourteenth amendment,
an action must deprive someone of "life, liberty, or property." Clearly,
property rights do not have to be in tangible objects. A person may have
a "property" right in his or her good name or reputation. The question
is which property rights should be protected. Although the fourteenth
amendment also protects "life" and "liberty," the most serious claims raised
in Justice Stevens' due process opinions relate to the protection of "prop-
erty" or "interests in property."
In Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), and Shirck
v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), Judge Fairchild decided that the
"career interests" of recently terminated untenured public teachers should
be protected. He held that the teacher in each case should have been given
a statement of reasons for dismissal and the opportunity to be heard. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has upheld a similar requirement when it was
alleged that the termination was due to the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). The Court,
however, has decided that the range of interests protected by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment was not unlimited. Thus, in re-
versing Judge Fairchild in both Roth and Shirck (and upholding Judge
Stevens' dissent in Shirck), the Court held that failure to rehire a publicly
employed teacher does not violate an interest in liberty or property pro-
tected by procedural due process unless there was a suggestion that the non-
retained teacher engaged in some impropriety. Board of Regents v. Roth,
403 U.S. 564, 570-75 (1972); Shirck v. Thomas, 408 U.S. 940 (1972). See
Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does the Nontenured Teacher Have a Constitu-
tional Right to a Hearing Before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL. B.J. 464 (1973);
Schulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty: Some Implications of Roth
and Sindermann, 51 DENvER L.J. 215 (1974); Comment, Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth: Procedural Due Process and the Rights of Non-
tenured Teachers, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 179 (1973). See also
Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1974).
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State Action
When private action involves some form of government intru-
sion, constitutional constraints may apply. Typically, government
action may be involved if a private individual or institution receives
aid, authority, or judicial enforcement of private rights.107 For Jus-
tice Stevens, the key to a state action analysis is to ascertain that
level of government involvement sufficient to engage the protec-
tions of the fourteenth amendment. 08
Dismissal of an untenured professor from a private university,10 9
refusal of a private hospital to allow use of its facilities for abor-
tions, 110 and refusal of a public utility to grant a pretermination
hearing"' are cases in which Justice Stevens has been disinclined
to apply fourteenth amendment constraints to the actions of pri-
vate parties. Both the university and the hospital were regulated
by and received substantial aid from the state." 2 Moreover, if the
federal and state funds had not been allocated to the hospital, they
could have been used to construct public facilities which could not
discriminate against women seeking abortions."1 Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, the level of governmental involvement
was not sufficient to constitute state action. First, the petitioners
107. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Re-
strictions to Private Activity, 74 COLum. L. REV. 656 (1974); Note, State Ac-
tion and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).
108. This is not to imply that Justice Stevens' views are unique. Rather,
they represent the prevailing view today. While speaking of all the connec-
tions between the state and the private discriminating restaurant, Justice
Clark stated:
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of
the [State], the benefits mutually conferred, together with the ob-
vious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a
public building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that
degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory ac-
tion which it was the design of the fourteenth amendment to con-
demn. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724(1961).
See also Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1975).
109. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976).
110. Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
111. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
112. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d
756, 761 (7th Cir. 1973).
113. Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 1973).
failed to show' 14 that the amount of money received transformed
these institutions into public entities for constitutional purposes.11
Second, the petitioners failed to show that the public funds fur-
thered the specific policies under attack." 6 Coinciding with the
views of other circuits," 7 his analysis emphasized that private insti-
tutions, although in part publicly funded, may exercise the same
right to discriminate which they would have absent any state in-
volvement." 8
Remedial Alternatives
The alleged denial of due process by a public utility raises a more
perplexing problem. In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.," 9
Justice Stevens concluded that the utility, though a state regulated
monopoly, 20 was not acting under color of state law. Because of
the role of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, he had ob-
vious difficulty deciding the state was not involved.' 21 Assuming
a state's failure to act may in certain situations violate due pro-
cess,' 22 the determining factor is whether the aggrieved party has
114. In Cohen, Justice Stevens both upheld the dismissal of the aggrieved
,professor's complaint and denied her further discovery procedures. In ef-
fect, Justice Stevens held that there was no possible way she could prove
her claim. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 825 n.18, 827 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976).
115. Id. at 825.
116. Id. at 825-26; Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 761 (7th
Cir. 1973).
117. See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1969);
Grossner v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). It is not clear how a general grant to an institution does not specific-
ally support every activity of that institution. See Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
118. An undercurrent in Justice Stevens' opinion in Doe was that Ms. Doe
had the burden of finding a hospital which would allow their facilities to
be used for abortions. Similarly, in Cohen, he expressed regret that the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 20OO0e-2 (1970), were modified too late to help Ms. Cohen. Com-
pare Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 255, with
42 U.S.C. § 200e-1 (Supp. II, 1972). Justice Stevens appears to be satisfied
that should Ms. Cohen be discriminated against in the future, she will have
a remedy. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 1975).
See also Special Project 136-39.
119. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). See
also Special Project 188-89.
120. Since Lucas the Supreme Court has gone further in limiting the pro-
cedural safeguards against improper termination of service by a utility com-
pany. For Justice Stevens, a critical point was that the power company
gave the plaintiff five days notice before termination. Id. at 653. Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), found that notice of termination was unnecessary.
121. 466 F.2d at 646.
122. For example, the state may have an affirmative duty to protect
[vor. 13: 899, 19763 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
other adequate remedies.123 For Justice Stevens, the fact that
plaintiff had several informal 124 and formal 125 remedies against the
power company indicated procedural safeguards were adequate. 12
The "adequate alternative remedy" theory also appears in cases in-
volving the invalidation of a high school dress code127 and the re-
fusal to rule on the vagueness of a state law.128 In both situations
the plaintiff had the option of following an established procedure
rather than seeking a ruling of unconstitutionality. 12 9 Justice
Stevens' policy finally provoked a sharp connent from a colleague.
"fundamental" rights. Cf. Public Util. Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 463-
64 (1952).
123. 466 F.2d at 648.
124. The record in Lucas shows that most disputes were settled by a com-
pany representative or through the offices of the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission. Id.
125. Justice Stevens maintains that the plaintiff has three formal reme-
dies. He may seek emergency relief in the state courts, pay the disputed
amount and sue for a refund, or sue in tort for any actual damages caused
by a wrongful termination by the power company. Id. at 648-49. Forcing
the customer to initiate these expensive remedies does not take into account
the relative economic and psychological inequalities of the two sides.
126. See generally Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Termi-
nations of Utility Service For Nonpayment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (1973);
Note, Constitutional Safeguards for Public Utility Customers: Power to the
People, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (1973); Comment, Light a Candle and Call
an Attorney-the Utility Shutoff Cases, 58 IND. L. REv. 1161 (1973).
127. In Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972), the court invali-
dated the dress code on constitutional grounds. Justice Stevens dissented
because the plaintiff had the alternative of exempting himself from the
dress code by bringing his parents to school to verify their approval of his
long hair. Id. at 945.
128. In Horvath v. Chicago, 510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff
complained that a state statute was unconstitutionally vague. Justice Ste-
vens used a novel argument based on the fact that the plaintiff was also
pursuing state remedies. He held that federal involvement was unjustified
because: (1) if the state court finds for the plaintiff, he has an adequate
state remedy; and (2) if the state court finds against the plaintiff, the
statute is no longer vague as to him.
129. This specie of argument demonstrates again Justice Frankfurter's
ideological relationship to Justice Stevens. Compare:
[F]rankfurter, while scorning the sledge-hammer word "unconsti-
tutional," has, more than any other Justice, used the stiletto of stat-
utory interpretation to cut effective regulation to a minimum, often
below what Congress clearly intended; the supplementary device
of using narrow interpretation explicitly to avoid a constitutional
issue is also a Frankfurter favorite; in either case, the result is the
same .... Rodell, supra note 1, at 705,
with text accompanying note 17 supra. See note 13 supra.
In my opinion, the claim of vagueness of a statutory provision is
a proper question for a federal court to decide in a civil case given
the fact that the plaintiff has standing (using that term broadly)
to assert the challenge with respect to his own conduct. If one in
attempting to protect a property interest from state interference can
arguably assert that his conduct is not included within the pro-
hibitory terms of a vague statute, he ought not have to await the
finality of a state proceeding against him before asserting his con-
stitutional right to procedural due process. To require him to do
so is an impermissible form of abstention. Indeed, as I read the
last paragraphs of Judge Stevens' opinion, I discern a theme of
abstention which I, for myself, wish to disavow.1 30
Fourteenth Amendment Property
In an opinion uncharacteristically brief and biting, 18 Justice
Stevens expressed concern that an expansive reading of the due
process clause would create excessive power in the federal judi-
ciary.'3 2 To him the problem is that the due process clause cannot
both define the substantive right to be protected and prescribe the
necessary procedural safeguards. Justice Stevens' rejection of sub-
stantive due process rights can best be explained in his own words.
Some years ago courageous and wise federal judges foresaw the
potential harm that might flow from arbitrary actions by state gov-
ernment. On the assumption that the due process clause was more
than a guarantee of fair procedure, they found a basis for substi-
tuting their views of sound policy for the "arbitrary" decisions of
state officials. Whether or not their policy judgments were correct,
their expansive interpretation of the due process clause was funda-
mentally erroneous. 133
Justice Stevens believes it is the function of the states, not the fed-
eral judiciary, to provide relief from arbitrary governmental ac-
ion.'3 4
130. 510 F.2d at 597 (Swygert, J., concurring).
131. Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing), vacated, 408 U.S. 940 (1971).
132. 447 F.2d at 1028. See also Bishop v. Wood, No. 74-1303 (U.S. June
10, 1976), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6, & 8 at 21, col. 6.
133. Id. at 1028-29.
134. In our opinion, the questions whether a nontenured teacher,
whose contract is not renewed, has any right to a statement of rea-
sons or to judicial review of the adequacy or accuracy of such a
statement are matters of state law, not federal constitutional law.
There are sound policy reasons to support either a statutory re-
quirement, or an administrative practice, that a complete and accu-
rate written statement of the reasons for such an important decision
be promptly delivered to the teacher. But since, by hypothesis, no
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest of the teacher
is impaired by the Board's action, she has no federally protected
right to a fair hearing or to a fair statement of reasons. The fact
that a state, or a School Board, may voluntarily communicate more
information to her, or receive more information from her, than the
Constitution requires, is not in itself sufficient to create a federal
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For Justice Stevens a dismissal of a claim based on violation of
due process is not actually a ruling on the merits. Although he
often acknowledges existence of the injustice he is unwilling to read
the Constitution so broadly as to grant a federal claim for relief.
Thus, if the property or interest in property sought to be protected
is not guaranteed by another clause of the Constitution, he believes
that no federally enforceable claim should exist.'1 35
Gender Discrimination: An Exception
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964136 explicitly gives juris-
diction to the federal court to decide cases based on gender dis-
crimination.137 Thus the policy decisions reflected in Justice Stev-
ens' gender discrimination opinions cannot be cloaked in the previ-
ously mentioned shroud of judicial abstention. In Sprogis v. United
Air Lines,1 8 an airline stewardess was discharged for violating
right that does not otherwise exist. Jeffries v. Turkey Run Con-
solidated School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974).
But see Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (fifth amendment due
process). In Eskra Justice Stevens invalidated a Wisconsin statute (illegiti-
mate children cannot inherit through their mother's estate) when the dis-
tributor is the United States. Id. Compare Hampton v. Sun Wong, 44
U.S.L.W. 4737, 4741 (U.S. June 1, 1976) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment ... has a substantive as well as a procedural aspect."),
with id. at 4740 n.17. See also Special Project 131-34.
135. Here Justice Stevens' views appear to parallel Mr. Justice Black's
concern that flexible standards of constitutional adjudication lead to unpre-
dictable results. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,
76 HARv. L. REV. 673, 717 (1963).
There would be a federal claim, however, if the protested action inter-
fered with a constitutionally protected right. Jeffries v. Turkey Run Con-
solidated School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974).
For it is familiar doctrine that a State cannot discriminate among
its citizens on the basis of their race or, for example, their exercise
of rights protected by the First Amendment.... [T]he standards
for implementing the concept of substantive due process are found
elsewhere in the Constitution, and not merely in the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th
Cir. 1975), reh'g granted, id. at 1057.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
137. It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. ... Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
See generally Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court, 1975,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 235 (1975); Lombard, Sex: A Classification in Search of
Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1355 (1975); Special Project 174-75.
138. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
United's no-marriage rule. The majority held that because male
stewards' 3 9 were under no such restraint, United was discriminat-
ing against its stewardesses on the basis of their sex.140 In dissent
Justice Stevens argued that a literal reading of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 would result in the conclusion that men are discriminated
against because they are ineligible for those jobs held by steward-
esses.' 4 ' He describes such a result as anomalous. A reductio
ad absurdum analysis of Justice Stevens' position leads to the con-
clusion that discrimination against one sex is permissible so long
as discrimination of a different kind exists against the other. 4 2
Two years later Justice Stevens again dissented. In Rose v.
Bridgeport Brass Co.,' 43 the majority reversed a summary judgment
against a woman employee who alleged gender discrimination as
evidenced by a drastic change in the female-male employee ratio.144
Justice Stevens maintained that the summary judgment should be
upheld because the woman had not demonstrated the employer's ac-
tions were motivated by an intent to discriminate against female
employees.'4 5 The Supreme Court, however, has held that such a
139. Apparently, the male "flight cabin attendants" on overseas flights
had essentially the same duties as stewardesses on regular flights. 444 F.2d
at 1199.
140. Id.
141. Justice Stevens' argument was that, except for certain flights, males
were not eligible for the jobs held by stewardesses. Because until 1966 no
male was eligible for the job held by Ms. Sprogis, there were no males
similarly situated who were not discriminated against by the no-marriage
rule. Id. at 1203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1202. The Supreme Court rejected this line of argument when
applied to racial discrimination. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
143. 487 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1973).
144. Id. at 809.
145. Id. at 813 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While voting to uphold a sum-
mary judgment against the woman, Justice Stevens stated:
The three factors discussed so far include no evidence that any of
the actions taken by the company were motivated by an intent todiscriminate against the plaintiff or against female employees. Sup-port for the discrimination charge is predicated entirely on the fact
that the operating changes resulted in a change in the relative num-
ber of females employed in the department and employed as blank-
ing press operators. Id.
Discriminatory motivation, however, has been held unnecessary. The
courts are in agreement that if the result is discriminatory, there is a triable
issue as to whether the practice has ". . . a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
See Harper v. T.W.A., 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Washington,
512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976)(Stevens, J., concurred separately, id. at 4800, "the line between discrimina-
tory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright .... );
Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975); NAACP
v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
Bridgeport Guardians v. Members of Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973);
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demonstration is unnecessary in the application of Title VII to ra-
cial discrimination. 146 Justice Stevens seemed to fear a rejection
of the motivational requirement would eventually force the conclu-
sion that a member of the disfavored sex would be entitled to a
trial whenever a one-to-one employment ratio is absent.147
A possible reason for Justice Stevens' position may be found in
his statements during his confirmation hearings. At one point he
explained that he would apply the same standards in cases involv-
ing the rights of women as in those involving the rights of Blacks.148
The next day, however, he acknowledged he might apply a different
standard of review in gender discrimination cases.149 When pressed
by Senator Kennedy, Justice Stevens stated that he was more con-
cerned about racial discrimination than about gender discrimina-
tion.1 0 In other words, as with contracts and statutes, Justice
Stevens returns to the primacy of the text. Whereas there is a tex-
tual reference to racial equality, sexual equality is yet to be ac-
corded that level of constitutional dignity.' 5 ' Thus Justice Stevens'
less stringent standard of review as applied to gender discrimina-
tion is another manifestaion of this narrow approach to document-
ary construction.
Prisoners' Rights
Prisoners' rights has been an expanding field since 1968.152 Jus-
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
146. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
147. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 814 (7th Cir. 1973) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). What is so odd about Justice Stevens' treatment of
Griggs is that he is usually scrupulous about following the dictates of the
Supreme Court. He is always careful to distinguish the views of individualjustices to avoid citing an opinion as controlling if a majority has not
formed around the particular issue. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 505
F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir.
1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also Comment, The Law of Libel-
Constitutional Privilege and The Private Individual: Round Two, 12 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 455 (1975).
148. Hearings 34, supra note 4.
149. Id. at 57.
150. Id. at 16.
151. See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XMI, XIV, XV.
This is not to suggest that racial and sexual equality are substitutable
as X and Y in an algebraic formula of equal protection. See Keynote ad-
dress by Professor Ginsburg, "Realizing the Equality Principle" (6th Na-
tional Conference on Women and the Law), as cited in, G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERiALS ON CoNsTiTuToNAL LAw 771 n.2 (9th ed. 1975).
152. The leading case is Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). See Wolf
tice Stevens is proud of his contributions5 3 and has demonstrated
a marked sensitivity to the tragedy of the United States correctional
system.154 We do not portend to review the entire field; rather we
will use this area as an exemplar of how Justice Stevens imple-
ments a policy decision.
For Justice Stevens the tension between the constitutional rights
of prisoners, the need for prison security, and the discretion which
must be allowed prison officials is an intense reality. Justice
Stevens' twenty-eight 55 opinions relating to prisoners' rights dem-
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Wilwording v. Svenson, 404 U.S.249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546 (1964). See generally Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District of
Illinois, 6 LoYoLA-CHI. U.L.J. 527 (1975); Note, The Fourteenth Amendment
and Prisons: A New Look at Due Process for Prisoners, 26 HAsTINs L.J.
1277 (1975); Comment, Due Process at In-Prison Disciplinary Proceedings,
50 Cui.-KENT L. Ruv. 498 (1973); Comment, Due Process Clause held ap-
plicable to the revocation of statutory good time credits and punitive segre-
gation in interprison administrative actions, 7 IND. L. Rnv. 601 (1974); Com-
ment, New Barrier to Federal Court Review: The Habeas Corpus Exhaus-
tion Requirement as Applied to Prisoners' Conditions of Confinement, 9
N w ENGLAND L. REv. 615 (1974); Comment, A Giant Step Backwards: The
Supreme Court Speaks Out on Prisoners' First Amendment Rights, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 352 (1975).
153. See Hearings 15, 73. Justice Rutledge was also concerned about the
plight of prisoners. See Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, supra note 4, at 327-34. See also United States v. MacCollom, No. 74-1487 (U.S. June 10, 1976)(Stevens, J. dissenting), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6, &
8, at 21, col. 6.
154. Justice Stevens quoted the following passage with approval:
It is, for the most part, a policy of isolation and punishment accom-
panied by the rhetoric of rehabilitation, which results in the chronic
underfinancing, inadequate staffing, deflected sexuality, and gen-
eral lack of resources and poverty of imagination that characterizes
our prisons and jails. H. Mattick, The Prosaic Sources of PrisonViolence 2, cited in Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1349 n.15(7th Cir. 1973), reh'g, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974). But cf. Special
Project 159-60.
155. Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens,
J., concurring), rel'g granted, id. at 1057; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311(7th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975) (Douglas, J., would have granted
certiorari); Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); Mueller v. Turcott, 501 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1974) (participated);
United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 166, 173 (7th Cir. 1974) (en bane)(Stevens, J., dissenting); Peters v. Gray, 494 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1974)(per curiam); Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens,J., concurring); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1974) (partici-
pated); Haines v. Kerner, 492 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing), rel'g, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Knell v. Bensinger, 489
F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Shead v. Quatsoe, 486 F.2d 694 (7th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973); Ganz
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onstrate that although he is uncertain about the appropriate relief,
he believes some action should be taken. He has adopted a go-
slow' 56 attitude while seeking the advice of prison officials. 157 The
best way to comprehend his position is to examine a hypothetical
prisoner and then to demonstrate how Justice Stevens has circum-
scribed the implementation of his policy preference.,
Before the prisoner arrives in federal court, available state reme-
dies must be exhausted. 158 Once in court, pro se litigants will re-
ceive deferential treatment,159 but if an attorney is appointed, the
attorney's opinion will be given great weight.16 0 If Justice Stevens
reaches the merits, he will limit himself to the individual case in
granting relief or will establish minimum procedural safeguards. 161
v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1973); United States ez Tel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973); United
States ex Tel. Montgomery v. Illinois, 473 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam); Wimberly v. Laird, 472 F.2d 923 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
921 (1973); United States ex tel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d (7th Cir.
1973); United States ex tel. Kendzierski v. Brantley, 447 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1971); Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 925 (1972); Davis v. United States, 446 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); United States v. McGarthy, 445 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1971); Harris
v. Pate, 440 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Reid, 437 F.2d 1166
(7th Cir. 1971). Unless otherwise indicated, Justice Stevens wrote the ma-jority opinion in each of the above decisions.
156. United States ex tel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 n.37 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973).
157. Id. at 718.
158. See Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975). Justice
Stevens' equivocation on this point is characterized by the following state-
ment:
This is not to suggest that the plaintiff in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 ac-
tion must exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal relief.
Rather, it seems to us that the availability of an adequate state
remedy for a simple property damage claim avoids any constitu-
tional violation. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.
1975).
In concurrence, Chief Judge Fairchild thought that "[t]he availability of a
state remedy in damages [was] irrelevant . . . ." Id. at 1321.
159. Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 1972). But cf. Kenner
v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 19, 24 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(taxation).
160. Justice Stevens is concerned that if attorneys for indigent defendants
are overburdened, the bar will fail to provide enough lawyers to represent
indigents. See Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States ex tel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1973); Nickols
v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972). Accord, Special Project 181 n.296. But cf. Comulada v. Pickett,
455 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
161. See text accompanying note 17 supra. The statement is not pre-
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Limited relief is critical in understanding Justice Stevens. He is
uncomfortable granting prospective relief from future injury on the
basis of broad, ill-defined policies. For example, in Morales v.
Schmidt,0 2 the court rejected a prisoners' first amendment' 08 ob-
jection to a partial ban on his letter writing privileges. In dissent,
Justice Stevens stressed the ad hoc nature of the provisions as
ground for reversal:
In my opinion, any action which abridges First Amendment rights
bears a heavier burden of justification if it implements an ad hoc
determination rather than a preformulated standard. Guidelines
which evidence awareness of the conflicting considerations that
should influence particular decisions are presumptively valid.104
Morales is characteristic of Justice Stevens' prisoners' rights deci-
sions requiring the creation of procedural safeguards.
Justice Stevens is comfortable with a procedural due process
analysis. He has embraced the Supreme Court's description of
cisely accurate because when Justice Stevens must confront a broad proce-
dural question, he tends to enunciate minimal safeguards and then allow
case-by-case adjudication to work out the details. See, e.g., Bonner v.
Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex tel. Miller
v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 718-19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146(1973).
Again, the idea has its origins in the thought of Justice Rutledge:
The majority had adopted a rigid jurisdictional rule-even reject-ing the government's offer to waive its objection to jurisdiction-partly because a contrary rule, if applied mechanically, would have
unfortunate consequences. In Rutledge's view, both extreme posi-
tions could be avoided by placing greater reliance on the judgment
of judges. Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, supra note 4, at 329.
See notes 11, 13 supra.
This type of solution, narrow right accompanied by case law develop-
ment, is characteristic of Justice Stevens' approach to problems. See Eason
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 670 n.29 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Burger, C.J., Douglas & White, J.J.,
would have granted certiorari. Powell, J. took no part in the decision.),
overruled, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 427 U.S. 723 (1975).
Although this type of decision provides the litigants with an adequate solu-
tion, it would provide inadequate guidance to the lower courts if Justice
Stevens continues this policy on the Supreme Court. See Gunther, InSearch of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1026 (1972). See also Liles v. Oregon, 44
U.S.L.W. 3623 (U.S. May 4, 1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
162. 489 F.2d 1335, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rational
relationship standard applied to prisoner's correspondence), reh'g en banc,
494 F.2d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring) (reasonably and
necessarily related to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of im-
prisonment standard), rev'g, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wisc. 1972) (compel-
ling state interest standard).
163. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See also Special Project 141-44.
164. 489 F.2d at 1348 (footnote omitted).
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"fundamental fairness" as the "touchstone of due process."'165 In
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,' 1 6 he required that "until
the rule-making process has been given an opportunity to develop
more fully" the intraprison disciplinary action must meet the "bare
minimum" of procedural due process. 167 Although this opinion was
criticized by the dissent for its "cautious" attitude, 6 8 it is typical
of Justice Stevens. Rather than demanding the "full panoply"'1 9 of
constitutional safeguards, Justice Stevens merely required mini-
mum procedures and left the rest to the prison administrators.
Justice Stevens believes the judiciary uniquely qualified to decide
questions of procedural fairness. 7 0  This belief may explain why
165. See Shead v. Quatsoe, 486 F.2d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam),
citing, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
166. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973). See also
Special Project 187.
167. 479 F.2d at 716.
168. Id. at 722-23.
169. Id. at 713.
170. This idea is uniquely important because it is one of the two foci
of Justice Stevens' jurisprudence.
The idea originates with Justice Rutledge. He stated that:
Facts are primarily within the jury's function. Hence it must be
given wide latitude, or trial by jury becomes trial by court. But
the jury is not absolute in the realm of fact. Like judges, jurors
have weaknesses of emotion and judgment. Unlike judges, they
seldom have a background of decision experience against which to
check them. Our tradition supplies this through judicial controls
. Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Justice Stevens embraced this idea with the observation that:
Significantly, Rutledge identified the judges' "background of deci-
sion experience" as the faculty differentiating judges from jurors.
He had great faith in wisdom born of experience and mistrusted
untried statements of general principles. Stevens, Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, supra note 4, at 330.
But Justice Stevens would not fully develop the idea until Shirck v.
Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), which held the nonretention of a
nontenured teacher required a due process hearing. See text accompanying
notes 131-33 supra. In dissent, Justice Stevens enunciated one of his ration-
ales for limiting the judicial function:
In final analysis the "due process" decision will not turn on any
question of fair procedure but on a judge's evaluation of the sub-
stance of the administrative determination. I believe judges are
qualified by experience and training to evaluate procedural fairness
and to interpret and apply guidelines established by others; I do
not believe they have any special competence to make the kind of
policy judgment that this case implicitly authorizes. The assump-
tion that they do invites the reaction that was produced by deci-
sions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 [1905]. Id. at 1029
(emphasis added).
In other words, what began with Justice Rutledge as a narrow limitation,
he has aggressively sought to protect the procedural rights of pris-
oners while at the same time he limits the federal class based reme-
dies available to women. When an individual prisoner appears at
the appellate level, Justice Stevens takes two courses of action. He
first establishes minimum procedural safeguards and then limits his
subsequent review to a determination of whether the administra-
tive action is arbitrary. In contrast to this two-tier approach to
prisoners, Justice Stevens must confront the substantive question
of whether discrimination against women is present. Unlike with
intraprison disciplinary actions, the court cannot create procedural
rights under which some agency can adjudicate the particular issues
of a case. Thus, because Justice Stevens cannot limit women's
rights to procedure, as he can with prisoners', he has refused to
grant any relief. 171
CONCLUSION
According to Justice Stevens,17 2 the use of force in a democracy
must be legitimatized through the consensus formation process of
political rulemaking. Because the judiciary does not derive its
power from the democratic process, it should limit its policy forma-
tion role.
Even so, there is one area-procedural fairness-in which the ju-
diciary is especially qualified to play a more aggressive role. A his-
tory of decisionmaking experience and legal training inculcates
within the judiciary the traditions of fair play. Justice Stevens de-
mands strict compliance with not only the letter but also the spirit
but cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (Rutledge,
J.), on the primacy of the jury's fact-finding responsibility (U.S. CONST.
amend. VII) has become for Justice Stevens a limitation on the policy for-
mulation role of the judiciary. See also notes 4, 11, 13, 94, 153, 161 supra.
171. With all due respect to the Justice, we hazard a criticism of his tech-
nique of narrow construction. In the gender discrimination and prisoners'
rights cases Justice Stevens' technique of constitutional adjudication was
substantially similar; only the context changed. Therefore, we believe
these two lines of cases can be reconciled only by assuming unstated prem-
ises which Justice Stevens has not articulated in his decisions. Whatever
those premises are, we believe more forthright, if not more "principled,"
decisions would be rendered if these premises were articulated. See gen-
erally Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Develop-
ment of the Common Law, 5 HARv. L. Rsv. 172, 189, 197 (1891). Compare
Bishop v. Wood, No. 74-1303 (U.S. June 10, 1976) (5-4) (Stevens, J., writing
for the majority) (no due process termination hearing for public em-
ployees), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6, & 8, at 21, col. 6,
with United States v. MacCollom, No. 74-1487 (5-4) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(trial transcripts for prisoners), in L.A. Times, June 11, 1976, § 1, at 1,
cols. 5-6, & 8, at 21, col. 6.
172. See notes 13, 17, 74, 75, 129, 133, 134, 164 and accompanying text
supra.
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of procedural safeguards. When these procedural requirements are
satisfied, Justice Stevens believes the judiciary duty bound to fol-
low the substantive result reached by a political institution which
represents a consensual decision.
Justice Stevens' view of a judge's role allows us to unify his some-
what disparate opinions. The consensual intent of the parties,
whether contractual, statutory, or constitutional, is usually control-
ling. Administrative agencies are subject to a higher standard of
review because they represent a secondary level of consensus for-
mation. Until the consensus formation process has accorded sexual
equality the same constitutional consideration as racial equality, it
will not receive similarly solicitous treatment. 173 Although Justice
Stevens will not review substantive decisions made by prison ad-
ministrators,174 he does demand that those officials follow proce-
dures calculated to insure minimal standards of fairness.
In sum, Justice Stevens, in the tradition of Mr. Justice Powell,
will probably assume a centrist position on the Court. The present
Court majority "trust[s] institutions and officials.' 17 Therefore
the Court, though reluctant to enunciate "prophylactic rules," is
ready to grant relief in the particular case. 76  Similarly Justice
Stevens stated that the Court cannot be "a roving commission to
reform all the sins of the executive" but rather that it should grant
relief when the "perversion" of an agency function results in indi-
vidual injury.177
Future decisions will determine whether Justice Stevens' views
of a limited judicial role continue.
AFTERWORD
As this Comment goes to press, Justice Stevens' first two Su-
preme Court dissents lend credence to the themes identified in this
article.
173. As of this writing the Equal Rights Amendment, proposed U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVII, fell four short of the required thirty-eight ratifying
state legislatures. G. GuNTHER, supra note 151, at ciii n.t.
174. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 711-21 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1973).
175. Symposium, The Burger Court and the Constitution, 11 CoLUm. J.L.
& Soc. PROB. 35, 57 (1974) (Dean Paulsen speaking).
176. Id.
177. Hearings 30.
In a dissent joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens
thought the existence of an adequate state remedy and the absence
of actual' 78 injury precluded federal intervention.179 In the second
opinion, this time joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall, Justice Stevens continued to require minimum procedural
safeguards for prisoners. 80
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178. Compare Hearings 15 ("symbolic" value of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment), with note 179 infra.
179. Bucolo v. Adkins, 96 S. Ct. 1086 (1976). The problem in Bucolo was
a complex procedural issue. The Court had previously reversed petitioners'
obscenity convictions in Florida. Bucolo v. Florida, 421 U.S. 927 (1975).
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court sent the case to the trial court for
further proceeding. Bucolo v. State, 316 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975). Then the
State Attorney General nolle prossed the charges. At this point, the peti-
tioners requested the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Florida Su-
preme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court granted leave to file a
petition mandamus the Florida Supreme Court but declined to issue the ex-
traordinary writ after explaining Florida's error.
For the Court the determinative factor was
that nothing in the state court record, as it now stands, recognizes
that the State was foreclosed by this Court's decision from seeking
to convict petitioners of obscenity violations. We are unable to dis-
miss as insignificant petitioner's plaint that the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Florida, as it now stands, obscures this Court's fav-
orable adjudication on the merits-an adjudication which requires
full recognition by the state courts in order effectively to dispel
any opprobrium resulting from the accusation of obscenity. 96
S. Ct. at 1087-88.
In contrast, Justice Stevens argued that because "no matter what we do,
there will be no further proceeding in the underlying litigation," it was im-
proper to grant leave to file. Id. at 1088.
180. Enomoto v. Spain, 96 S. Ct. 1424 (1976). The Court stayed,
pending further appeal, the effect of a federal district court decision
requiring California corrections officials to hold hearings before placing un-
ruly prisoners in isolation. In contrast, Justice Stevens was "not persuaded
that the applicants ha[d] demonstrated a sufficient threat of irreparable in-jury to justify the exercise of this Court's power to issue an extraordinary
writ .... " Id.
